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EXCISE

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ACTION EA-12
INFO OCT-01 AIS-00 HA-06 CIAE-00 ICDE-00 NSAE-00
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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
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INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 21132
CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12065: GDS 12/1/86 (IMMERMAN, R. M.) OP-P
TAGS: SCPN, PEPR, SHUM, JA, KS
SUBJECT: (U) MORE DEVELOPMENTS IN KIM
DAE JUNG AFFAIR AND ROK-JAPAN RELATIONS
REF: (A) SEOUL 15897 (NOTAL); (B) SEOUL 15883 (NOTAL);
(C) TOKYO 21027; (D) TOKYO 21028
1. (C) SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER MET WITH JSP CHAIRMAN ASUKATA AND OTHERS ON NOV. 29, AT WHICH TIME ASUKATA DEMANDED GOJ BREAK ALL DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH ROK IF KIM IS EXECUTED. SDF DIETMAN HIDEO DEN URGED A MUCH MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH ON THE PM LATER THE SAME DAY. GOJ IS TAKING THE POSITION THAT IT HAS NOT YET DECIDED WHAT IT WILL DO ABOUT YEN LOANS TO SOREA IF KIM IS EXECUTED. DURING HIS PRESS INTERVIEWS ON THE 29TH, AMB. SUNCHE WAS EXTREMELY GUARDED IN ALL HIS COMMENTS ABOUT KIM; HE STEADFASTLY MAINTAINED THE PUBLIC LINE OF GRAVE CONCERN AND WATCHFUL WAITING. TWO NEWSPAPERS CARRIED ARTICLES ON THE NOV. 28 CABINET
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MEETING, DURING WHICH THE PM REPORTEDLY BRIEFED THE CABINET ON HIS NOV. 21 MEETING WITH ROK AMB. CHOI. GOJ CONTINUES TO ACT CALMLY AND CAUTIOUSLY; EVERY EFFORT IS BEING MADE TO AVOID AGGRAVATING A VERY TOUCHY SITUATION. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) ON NOV. 29 PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI MET WITH JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY (JSP) CHAIRMAN ASUKATA, GENERAL COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS (SOHYO) SECRETARY GENERAL TOMIZUKA, SOHYO CHAIRMAN MAKIBA AND TWO OR THREE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE "JAPAN LIAISON COUNCIL FOR SAVING KIM DAE JUNG." ASUKATA URGED THE PM TO HAVE THE GOVERNMENT DO ITS UTMOST TO SAVE KIM'S LIFE. [redacted] CONFIRMED PRESS REPORTS THAT HE SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED PM TO SEVER ALL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH ROK IF KIM IS EXECUTED. PM REPLIED CIRCUMSPECTLY, NOTING THAT SOME
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REVIEWED BY H. Teeple DATE 8/18/83
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NATIONS HAVE ACTED IN AN OVERT MANNER ON KIM'S BEHALF, OTHERS HAVE WORKED QUIETLY AND BEHIND THE SCENES. GOJ, HE SAID, IS CONSIDERING WHAT IT MIGHT DO TO PREVENT THE WORST FROM HAPPENING, BUT DID NOT GO INTO SPECIFICS. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, TOMIZUKA THEN GAVE THE PM A LIST OF 3.5 MILLION SIGNATURES COLLECTED BY THE LIAISON COUNCIL DURING A "SAVE KIM DAE JUNG" CAMPAIGN, AND TOLD SUZUKI THAT SOHYO IS PREPARING TO TAKE ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST SOUTH KOREA ON ITS OWN AS A WAY OF EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR KIM (SEPTEL).

3. (C) AFTER MEETING WITH ASUKATA ET AL., SUZUKI SPOKE TO SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION (SDF) CHAIRMAN BIDO DEN AND SDF SECRETARY GENERAL NAGAZAKI. [redacted] CONFIRMED SANKEI SHIMBUN REPORT THAT HE CRITIZED SOHYO'S ANNOUNCED REFUSAL TO LOAD CARGO ON SHIPS DESTINED FOR SOUTH KOREA, AS WELL AS

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ITS CAMPAIGN TO BOYCOTT ROK PRODUCTS. DEN SAID THAT SUCH ACTIONS WILL ONLY FAN ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT IN KOREA AND NOT HELP KIM AT ALL. HE ASKED THE PM TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE DOMESTIC SITUATION IN THE ROK IN HIS HANDLING OF THE KIM AFFAIR. THE PM THANKED DEN FOR HIS VIEWS.

4. (C) AT THE LOWER HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON NOV. 28, FM ITO WAS ASKED IF GOJ WOULD REEXAMINE KOREAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS IF KIM WERE EXECUTED, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF YEN LOANS. [redacted] ITO REPLIED QUITE PROPERLY THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO COMMENT AT THAT TIME BECAUSE IT HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHAT IT WOULD OR WOULD NOT DO. HOWEVER, AT THE LAST MOMENT HE ADDED THAT THE MEASURES HIS INTERLOCUTOR MENTIONED "MIGHT COME UNDER REVIEW." THUS IMPLYING GOJ IS CONSIDERING THE SUSPENSION OF YEN LOANS TO ROK. [redacted] THIS STATEMENT PROMPTED THE MINISTRY CLARIFICATION WHICH APPEARED IN NOV. 29 PRESS TO THE EFFECT THAT GOJ HAS NOT EXAMINED IN CONCRETE TERMS WHAT IT WOULD DO IF KIM IS EXECUTED. ALTHOUGH GOJ HOPES TO KEEP ITS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO KOREA SEPARATE FROM THE KIM CASE, IF HE IS EXECUTED GOJ REALIZES THAT IT MAY BECOME VERY DIFFICULT TO CARRY ON NORMAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS. (SOME PAPERS ON THE 29TH INTERPRETED MOFA "CLARIFICATION" AS A FLAT STATEMENT THAT GOJ WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT SUSPEND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO ROK REGARDLESS OF WHAT HAPPENS TO KIM.)

5. (U) JAPANESE AMBASSADOR TO ROK SUNOBE GAVE TWO PRESS INTERVIEWS ON NOV. 29, EACH ONE LASTING AN HOUR. THE LONGEST ACCOUNT APPEARED IN NOV. 30 MAINICHI. WHICH

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 21132
CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
GAVE IT PAGE ONE TREATMENT. SUNOBE WAS EXTREMELY GUARDED
IN ALL HIS COMMENTS, REFUSING TO SPECULATE ON THE OUTCOME
OF THE TRIAL AND MAINTAINING THE OFFICIAL POSITION OF
GRAVE CONCERN AND WATCHFUL WAITING. HE WOULD NOT COMMENT
ON THE NOV. 21 MEETING BETWEEN PM AND ROK AMB. CHOI.
6. (C) NOV. 29 YOMIURI AND SANKEI REPORT ON THE
DISCUSSION OF KIM WHICH OCCURRED AT THE PREVIOUS DAY'S
CABINET MEETING. SUZUKI REPORTEDLY EXPLAINED TO THE
CABINET WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED DURING HIS MEETING WITH
AMB. CHOI THE WEEK BEFORE. HE REITERATED THAT HE HAD
NOT INTERFERED IN KOREAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN HIS TALK
WITH CHOI, AND THAT HE HAD NEVER EXPECTED HIS REMARKS
TO BE LEAKED TO THE PRESS. YOMIURI REPORTED THAT THE
CABINET DECIDED THAT NO NEW MEASURES ON BEHALF OF KIM
WILL BE TAKEN AT THIS TIME, SUCH AS THE SENDING OF A
PERSONAL LETTER FROM SUZUKI TO ROK PRES. CHUN. E.O. 1,E4
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PRIORITY WOULD BE GIVEN TO CALMING DOWN THE SITUATION.
SUZUKI DID REPORTEDLY MENTION, HOWEVER, THAT IF ANTI
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WERE EXECUTED ANTI-ROK FEELING IN JAPAN WOULD SPREAD
AND THE GOVERNMENT WOULD FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO
COOPERATE WITH THE ROKG. WHATEVER ITS BEST INTENTIONS.
7. (C) [redacted] E.O. 1, A5

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